- A Delicate Decision: India’s Dilemma Over Extraditing Sheikh Hasina
By Jai Kumar Verma
New Delhi. 01 December 2025. The political situation in Bangladesh has become tense and uncertain after the International Crimes Tribunal sentenced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death. Her party, the Awami League, has launched widespread protests, and Bangladesh has formally asked India to extradite her. However, the India-Bangladesh extradition treaty gives India the option to refuse. At the same time, global powers like Pakistan, China and the United States are showing interest in the crisis, making the situation even more complex. In this delicate moment, India must carefully decide how to respond while protecting both its national interests and regional stability.
The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Bangladesh was established under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973, a law originally passed to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity related to the 1971 Liberation War. Although the Act dates from 1973, the ICT only became operational in 2010 following a campaign for justice, leading to the prosecution of key collaborators from the 1971 war. Over the years, the tribunal delivered dozens of verdicts, including several death sentences, but under its original mandate it focused largely on past war-era crimes. However, following the mass protests and political upheaval in mid-2024, the ICT was reconstituted, a second tribunal (ICT-2) was formed to speed up trials of new cases related to alleged crimes committed during the July–August uprising. In its current phase, the tribunal prosecuted high-profile leaders from the previous regime, including former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal and senior security officials. On 17 November, 2025 for “crimes against humanity” in relation to the crackdown on student-led movement in 2024, the tribunal awarded death sentence to Sheikh Hasina as well as to former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal. The tribunals are now scrutinising the conduct of law enforcement, the chain of command, and even civilian magistrates’ roles during the protest period. According to press reports both Sheikh Hasina as well as Kamal are in India.
Following the announcement of death sentence for Sheikh Hasina and Kamal, demonstrations and associated violence occurred in various locations, primarily in Dhaka, and other districts of Bangladesh. Security was heightened across the city, especially around the ICT and the Supreme Court area. Tear gas and sound grenades were used by police to disperse demonstrators in the streets. Protests were also organised by anti-Sheikh Hasina elements near Dhanmondi 32, the residence of Hasina’s late father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, where some miscreants tried to demolish the house. School buildings and several vehicles were burnt down by demonstrators in different places in the country.
Hasina’s now-banned Awami League (AL) party, called the verdict politically motivated, announced a nationwide shutdown/lockdown to protest the decision. Supporters were urged to mobilize, leading to clashes with security forces. On the other hand, people against Sheikh Hasina celebrated the judgement. The security forces took strong measures and issued a “shoot-at-sight” order in Dhaka for anyone involved in arson, attacks, or violence before and after the verdict to maintain public order. Human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International raised concerns about the fairness of the trial and the use of the death penalty.
The demonstrations reflect the deep political polarization in Bangladesh surrounding the trial and the interim government’s authority. Bangladesh watchers claim that the tribunal is complying the agenda of the interim government and the process and the judgement is completely biased. Not only this the tribunal is no longer focusing only on individual people, it is now taking action against big political groups, like trying to ban the Awami League by using terrorism laws. This kind of move can make political tensions grow even stronger. AL leaders and workers are feeling threatened as they are treated unfairly, hence its supporters may become more active or angry. That means more protests, unrest, or political mobilization could happen. These protests and demonstrations can only be avoided if interim government, Bangladesh National Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and other political parties find a way to talk, compromise, or work toward reconciliation of the situation.
These demonstrations could destabilize the interim government, especially in the run-up to elections. Such mass protests may lead to shutdowns, civil unrest, or even violent clashes, which could weaken the legitimacy of the interim regime. The demonstrations also show that Hasina still commands significant support among parts of the population. This could translate into political momentum if her party is allowed to contest future elections. If the protests are sustained and effective, they could force concessions from the interim government perhaps even rethinking the legal and electoral ban on the Awami League. Large-scale protests may draw more international scrutiny on Bangladesh’s interim government, raising questions about democratic rights, rule of law, and political persecution. This in turn could pressure Dhaka to moderate its approach, especially if foreign governments and multilateral institutions highlight the need for free, fair political processes. If protests become more confrontational, security forces may crack down, risking casualties and international condemnation. Political unrest could also harm Bangladesh’s economy and complicate governance during a fragile transition.
Bangladesh is not acting in isolation. Reports suggest that Pakistan, China, and the USA are paying attention or supporting Dhaka’s interim government. This external backing could embolden Dhaka. For India, this means its leverage is challenged by other major powers. India may need to counterbalance Chinese or Pakistani influence by reinforcing its own diplomatic engagement, investments, and security ties. India could also use multilateral forums like BIMSTEC, or Bay of Bengal regional mechanisms to maintain influence and encourage a stable transition process. Few Bangladesh watchers suggest that India may continue or deepen development cooperation (infrastructure, connectivity, trade) to anchor Bangladesh close and reduce the risk that unrest spirals out of control. However, it may be counter-productive as Bangladesh may develop feeling that India is frightened because of international support Dacca is getting and may adopt a sterner attitude.
Bangladeshi interim government argue that India has a “mandatory duty” under the extradition treaty, especially given the gravity of the charges (crimes against humanity) and the tribunal’s verdict to extradite Sheikh Hasina. There is also strong diplomatic pressure from Dhaka, which labels any refusal as an “unfriendly gesture” and a disregard for justice. From Bangladesh’s perspective, extraditing Hasina would be a demonstration of accountability and closure for victims and their families, reinforcing the rule of law.
The moot question is should/would India extradite Sheikh Hasina and others. The legal position is that India and Bangladesh have a bilateral extradition treaty (2013). However, Article 6 of the treaty mentions that extradition can be refused if the offence is of a political nature. Article 8 of the treaty further provides that India may refuse extradition, if it deems the request “unjust or oppressive,” such as if the accusations were made in bad faith or are politically motivated. In addition, India’s own Extradition Act, 1962 gives the Government of India discretion to deny extradition in a variety of circumstances: the request may be rejected if the court is not satisfied about dual criminality, or if the case appears politically motivated or oppressive.
Legal experts and former diplomats argue that India is not automatically bound to hand over Hasina simply because of the treaty, especially given the political overtones. There is concern within India that the trial was politically motivated; critics say the tribunal lacked independence and that Hasina may not have received a fair defence. Some argue that even though Hasina has been convicted, India may refuse because it does not recognise the tribunal (ICT) as an international body. Additionally, India could face serious human rights and reputational risks by extraditing someone to face a death sentence in a trial widely perceived as politicised.
Bangladesh’s political crisis has put India in a difficult position. New Delhi must balance its long friendship with Sheikh Hasina, its need for stability in the region, and its desire to avoid becoming directly involved in Bangladesh’s internal conflicts. Extraditing Hasina or allowing her to stay both carry risks, so India must act with caution and fairness. In the end, India’s main goal will be to support peace in Bangladesh while protecting its own long-term interests and maintaining trust with the Bangladeshi people.
(Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com
